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Introduction 
 
Japan and its neighbours South Korea and China have had a troubled relationship ever since the 
end of the Second World War, before which Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and during which 
Japan invaded China and committed what China perceived as grave atrocities and war crimes. 
During Japanese rule in the Korean peninsula, cultural assimilation became mandatory for 
Koreans and especially during the Second World War Korean life and production was in large 
part in service of the war effort. For the crimes committed during this period Japan has since 
made multiple monetary reparation payments, the two countries have declared each other allies 
and affirmed their friendly status repeatedly, most importantly at the Treaty on Basic Relations 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea of 1965 that was to normalize Japanese-South Korean 
relations. However, historical tensions have the tendency to get in the way of these efforts and 
eventually negate their initial positive effects on Japan-South Korean relations. Specifically, 
Japanese conservatives tend to release statements and take decisions that can be construed as 
nationalist and dismissive of its wartime past.  
 Despite these issues, Japan and South Korea have seen long-term progression regarding 
cooperation on many levels such as increased economical transactions, mutual cultural 
influences and participation in multilateral talks on economic and security issues. The reason the 
historically rooted antagonism repeatedly returns to the forefront seems to be mainly due to 
conservative Japanese and South Korean politicians aggravating these underlying feelings of 
historical injustice by making and performing antagonising statements and actions. Examples of 
this would be the occurrences of Japanese politicians visiting the Yasukuni shrine to honor the 
war dead of Japan, and South Korean politicians raising the question of further compensation for 
wartime sexual slavery of Korean women multiple times during multilateral summits. So why 
does Japan continue to antagonize its neighbours with controversial statements and actions, that 
are interpreted by its neighbours as nationalistic and offensive? 
The literature on this subject within the International Relations school tends to look at the 
problematic relations between these two countries in one of two ways. The first is scholars who 
analyze the issue from a more classical International Relations perspective in which balancing 
for power and threat is most important. The most notable scholar who takes this approach is Cha 
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with his quasi-alliance model, for which his main argument is that as long as Japan and South 
Korea have a shared ally in the United States who is very involved in the region, Japan and 
South Korea have no reason to strengthen their relationship because they are protected (Cha 
2000, 263-264). Other notable scholars who use a similar approach are Tae-Ryong Yoon who 
argues that high threat perceptions of outside states would encourage more cooperation between 
Japan and South Korea (Yoon 2006, ), and Key Young Son who argues that Japan and South 
Korea are just „middle powers‟ which need an alliance to a great power such as the US or China 
and thus have no need for extensive cooperation with each other (Son 2014, 110-112). The other 
approach is that  historical tensions and issues stemming from these tensions play the central role 
in the analysis. Notable scholars are Cheol Hee Park who blames lack of trust and prevailing 
nationalist sentiments for the poor relationship between Japan and South Korea (Park 2009, 257-
265), Hyung Gu Lynn who argues that there is a „systemic lock‟ in place of Japanese financial 
compensation payments towards South Korea when it pressures Japan on the historical issues, 
and Japanese politicians then use the outrage this causes in Japan to increase their domestic 
influence (Lynn 2000, 80-84). Gavan McCormack takes an approach different than these two, 
saying that the Japanese government is using nationalistic sentiments in Japan to achieve 
national objectives such as the revision of the Japanese constitution (namely the pacifist article 
9), disguising their further committedness to the United States by making nationalistic gestures, 
ignoring the international backlash to these actions and thus seeming more committed to their 
own country‟s ideals and values than foreign relations (McCormack 2004, 43-45). This approach 
is interesting, but McCormack does not further explore how these domestic influences operate. 
These domestic influences on Japanese international relations policy remain on the 
periphery of many theories but are never fully explored. In this thesis we will examine what this 
domestic influence is, focusing on the influence of nationalism and nationalist organisations 
since Japan has a very strong undercurrent of nationalist organisations that have many politicians 
as members. The strongest of these organisations is the Nippon Kaigi, or „Japan Conference‟. 
Organised nationalism is the strongest clue of what might be causing the continued provocation 
by Japan of its East Asian neighbours, and this is what will be the central research question of 
this thesis: How and to what extent did nationalism and nationalist organisations influence the 
decision making process on foreign policy, particularly toward South Korea, of the Abe 
administration from 2012 to the present? 
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By answering this question I will argue that the ongoing troubles between Japan and South 
Korea are not satisfactorily explained by the classical approach of analysing it as a struggle for 
power between the two nations trying to carve out the most beneficial position for themselves. I 
will argue instead that domestic interests are, when looking at this issue, the most crucial 
influence on these countries‟ relations, focusing more on how domestic interests are balanced 
against international considerations and the influence and power smaller domestic groups, in this 
case nationalism, have on international relations. The importance of this approach is twofold. 
Firstly, as stated above this perspective on the subject has not yet been properly explored in the 
International Relations field. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, domestic influences on 
relations between states are underexplored in International Relations as a discipline and 
theoretically. By using this approach we can shine new light upon the subject but also find new 
ways to engage issues in the International Relations field. The method which we will be using to 
explore this domestic influence is that of Robert Putnam‟s Two-Level Game. In the next chapter 
we will explain this theory and review the scholarly critique of it, ending in an explanation of 
how the method will be applied to answer the research question and an outline of the thesis‟ 
structure. 
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Methodology 
 
Since we are trying to answer the question of how a particular group, nationalist conservatives in 
Japan, has influenced the foreign policy of Prime Minister Abe, realist or other state-focused 
theory does not suffice. To uncover and analyze the chain of events and subsequent influencing 
and decision making we have to turn instead to a methodology that covers the domestic as well 
as the international. The most suitable theoretical framework is that of Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA). This framework deals with how the decision making process of foreign policy works and 
thus how decisions are made. However, FPA is a very broad framework that can encompass 
many types of theories and methods. Considering the limited scope of this study, we require a 
somewhat more compact framework that looks at domestic influences on the making of foreign 
policy. A fitting candidate is Two-Level Game Theory, proposed by Robert Putnam in 1988.  
Putnam argued that frameworks that focus on events in either the international or the 
domestic sphere are too limited and that a synthesis of the two where they are entangled gives a 
more complete picture. The Two-Level Game consists of these two levels: Level 1, the 
international level where bargaining occurs between chief negotiators which represent states. 
Level 2, the domestic level, in which bargaining occurs about whether or not the international 
agreement bargained for by the chief negotiator on Level 1 is to be accepted. Any achievement 
in Level 1 has to be approved by Level 2, or the international „deal‟ will be either outright 
dismissed or have to be renegotiated. To figure out what to bargain for, the chief negotiator in 
Level 1 has to define what Putnam calls „win sets‟: all the different potential Level 1 proposals 
that Level 2 would accept and thus result in a „win‟. The chief negotiator will have to easiest 
time finding win sets if the range of win sets on Level 2 are very broad, thus leading to 
acceptance of a broader range of proposals. Often times the major players on Level 2 will try to 
narrow the Level 1 win sets down by agreeing only to specific things, since this heightens the 
Level 1 bargaining power as their chief negotiator will not accept proposals that might be vastly 
in the advantage of the other party or leave potential spoils (political or economic) on the table. 
Win sets are most easily recognized after the deal has been made, since the outcome of the deal 
itself has to fall within the win set determined by Level II considerations beforehand. After 
analysing the outcome the situation on Level II can be researched to determine what domestic 
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groups and factors made the deal possible, thus revealing the win set that was fulfilled by the 
negotiator (Putnam 1988, 427-429, 433-459). In our case, the chief negotiator would for example 
be Shinzo Abe, and the Level 2 players would be his constituency and governmental 
administration. The reason the theory is helpful in determining nationalist influences on Abe is 
because as the chief negotiator we can see where he has to adjust his international bargaining to 
accommodate for domestic influences, and thus we can see more clearly who he has to adjust for 
more than others. 
There have been varying critiques of Putnam‟s Two-Level Game theory. Knopf made 3 
criticisms of Putnam‟s Two-Level Game. First of all, Knopf argued that Putnam did not 
adequately address the differences in transgovernmental, transnational and cross-level domestic-
international interaction. What Knopf means by this is that both governmental and non-
governmental actors in Level 2 in both countries of the negotiation can interact with and 
influence each other. His second criticism was that Putnam had not acknowledged that alliances, 
such as the alliance between Japan and the United States, could change the situation in 
negotiations between two countries. Knopf‟s thirdly argued that there is not always a single chief 
negotiator. For example, domestic groups can in some cases also act as international negotiators. 
(Knopf 1993, 599-623). Knopf‟s second critique is echoed in part by Mitchell, who states that 
Putnam assumes that negotiations are always bilateral while in reality states are almost always 
influenced by international organisations and the constraints they place upon these states. 
Mitchell states that in Two-Level Games theory most scholars look at the international Level 1 
as a simple bilateral negotiation and then focus on the domestic Level 2. Since this trivializes a 
complex level of analysis, you must look at international influence from outside the two 
negotiating parties and appreciate the complexity of these negotiations (Mitchell 2001, 43-44).  
More recently, Yasuaki found two flaws in Putnam‟s assumptions: political culture seems 
to matter more than homogeneity or politicization of issues and aside from side-payments to 
domestic parties, negotiators can expand their win-sets simply by using appealing rhetoric and by 
avoiding a clear position so that domestic parties are left confused as to what is actually being 
bargained for. In short, Yasuaki expands the role of the individual negotiator and their options 
(Yasuaki 862-863).  
Patterson added to Two-Level Game theory and made it their own. Patterson wrote not 
about a Two-Level, but a Three-Level Game. The third level is an international organisation, the 
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European Communities. Patterson added this level because she believed that during the 
bargaining for a policy shift in European agricultural policy, these third level also played an 
integral part and actors in the other two levels took this third level into account for their 
strategies (Patterson 1997, 135-137.) My conclusion is that many scholars criticize Putnam‟s 
theory, but mostly not for inherent flaws but for things Putnam had not considered. Most 
scholars go on to add to or make changes to Putnam‟s theory, such as Patterson above or Savage 
and Weale who created a new Two-Level Game that mirrored that of Putnam: instead of an 
empirical Two-Level Game, they created a Normative one in which each actor has to consider 
the reasonableness of their demands. In practice this means that even when faced with an 
opposing party who holds a weaker position, concessions might still be made for them since it is 
expected within the normative logic of the international situation (Savage, Weale 2009, 63-81). 
The Two-Level Game Theory is a good place to start when considering domestic factors 
in foreign policy making. However, it is not immediately applicable to all questions and it is not 
a comprehensive system for analysis. It also does not take into account that the Chief Negotiator 
is not necessarily a purely rational actor since they are almost without exception human beings, 
and so are the domestic influencers. Another interesting point is that the win-set is not 
necessarily determined by the entire domestic sphere, but simply by those elements the 
negotiator needs to satisfy the minimum requirements for ratification of agreements. In the case 
of Abe this might be the conservative party and their constituency, and he may not need to 
consider other parts of society. Despite its flaws, Two-Level Games Theory has shown that it is 
very malleable, perhaps precisely because it is not a closed analytical system. 
What we will research in this study is why the necessary elements to be influenced were 
nationalist conservatives for Abe, why those specific elements were chosen to be appealed to and 
what the „win sets‟ were for them. Two-Level Games is fitting to find a comprehensive answer 
to these questions as it will lead us to the sources of domestic influence by analysing Abe‟s win-
sets. We will come to our conclusion by using Two-Level Games in reverse order: we will look 
at what the win-sets were for them by looking at policy outcomes, which domestic elements were 
vying for these terms and then consider their policy goals and why they were in this position of 
power.  
In this thesis we will largely be making interpretative analyses, and relying less on 
quantitative research. We will be analysing previous scholarly research, newspaper articles and 
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speeches made by the prime ministers. The first two types of sources will be used to collect 
scholarly work and general information on the subjects, while the speeches will be analysed to 
identify what kind of rhetoric the prime minister uses. By doing this we can see which groups 
they are trying to appeal to. The lack of quantitative evidence is this thesis‟ greatest potential 
weakness, but there is no effective method of putting the analysis of the questions we are asking 
in quantitative terms: it is my opinion that the decision making process can not be neatly fitted 
into a causal system and that we have to interpret each part of the process individually to come to 
a greater understanding. For the scholarly research we will be looking at different ways of 
approaching the topic and the newspaper articles, press releases and speeches contain valuable 
information that we need to complete our picture of the situation. 
We will be splitting this thesis into 4 chapters. The first chapter will give a brief overview 
of Post-World War II Nationalism and how it has changed since then, giving valuable 
information on the place of nationalism in Japanese society and politics. The second chapter will 
identify Abe‟s win-sets by looking at his policy behavior. The third chapter will identify the 
domestic groups that Abe has to balance for in his foreign policy decision making, and the final 
chapter will analyze how exactly Abe realizes this domestic balancing. 
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Chapter 1: Post World War II nationalism in Japan: a brief 
overview 
 
After the Second World War, many nationalist writers fell out of grace due to the new system 
imposed upon Japan by the United States wherein the Emperor became a symbolic figurehead 
and the explicit locus of politics was on the elected government. Nationalism reemerged in 1955 
when a group of nationalist scholars and politicians started what became known as the first 
textbook controversy. Nozaki and Selden argue that this controversy took place as a sort of 
substitute for the struggle over the 1946 constitution and its pacifist nature: since that argument 
was settled and no longer up for debate, school textbooks became the new battleground for 
nationalist thinkers. This first textbook controversy centered on what some believed to be anti-
capitalist propaganda being inserted in textbooks which glorified China‟s culture and made Japan 
look like the inferior country in ages past. The most important consequence of the first textbook 
controversy was that the Ministry of Education became more bold in actively encouraging school 
textbook authors to write more favorably about Japan‟s history and now called for the cultivation 
of nationalism. The Ministry of Education became quite persistent and dominant in their 
revisionism and authors had only limited success in fighting their censorship. One of the 
Ministry‟s comments on a 1950s textbook, taken from Selden and Nozaki‟s research, makes the 
tone of the conversation clear: “Do not write bad things about Japan in the Pacific War. Even 
though they are facts, represent them in a romantic manner” (Nozaki, Selden 2009, 1-3). 
In the 1960s, most prominently at the hand of Hayashi Fusao, nationalism reared its head 
once more. Once a communist thinker who turned to nationalism based on the Emperor as a 
means to keep writing on societal and governmental issues in the 1930s, he returned to 
prominence in the 1960s when he wrote an essay for Chūōkōron (Central Review) and now 
turned to what many called Ultranationalism. He proposed that Japan‟s imperial ambitions in 
Asia had been justified in multiple ways: it had tried to unify Asia so as to protect it against 
Western Colonialism and it had only reacted to the Western „threat‟, which was the threat of 
colonization or otherwise domination of East Asia. This essay became very controversial 
immediately and shocked those who adhered to the new „pacifist way‟ (Long 2000). The reason 
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this is relevant is because it shows that what public expressions of nationalism and resistance to 
war apology were often espoused for those not now involved in politics. It signifies the loosening 
of the taboo on nationalism since the Second World War ended. 
 At the end of the 1970s, several LDP members once more raised concerns about the 
content of school textbooks. They apparently found communist sentiments and foreign 
influences in the way the textbooks described Japanese actions in the Second World War. A 
portion of LDP members called the „young hawks‟ by their progressive counterparts took this 
opportunity to severely tighten the leash of government censorship on school textbooks when 
Morita Masaaki wrote an influential book on „self-flagellating‟ history in school textbooks. They 
changed the way they described the invasion of China and the abuse of the so-called „Comfort 
Women‟. This led to the textbook controversy of 1982 when China took offense to the new 
textbooks, and Japan promised to change some of the language back. This meant that the the 
contents of school textbooks were now accepted to be shaped by government policy. This led to 
the heightened activity of a group called the Nihon wo mamoru kokumin kaigi or the National 
Conference to Defend Japan who then published their own, very revisionist, textbook. This 
loosely organised group later merged with others of its kind to become the Nippon Kaigi or 
Japan Conference, which we will come back to later (Shibuichi 2008). What is interesting about 
this „wave‟ of nationalism is that it was a concerted effort by both politicians and scholars, 
giving it an air of authority. 
 The next peak in nationalism occurred in 1995. In the early 1990s, the knowledge that the 
Japanese military had forced many South Korean women into prostitution as so-called „Comfort 
Women‟ became widespread and caused civil unrest in South Korea and Japan. This prompted 
several progressive Japanese politicians to rephrase their stance on the war, now calling it unjust, 
mistaken and colonial in nature. This in turn motivated conservative politicians from the LDP to 
form the Committee for the Examination of History, which funded newly revised textbooks and 
the spread of scholarly research which glorified the „Great East Asian War‟. What followed was 
a struggle between nationalist politicians and those who wished to issue a formal apology to 
those who had suffered from Japanese actions during the war. This culminated in the issue of a 
formal apology by Prime Minister Murayama, and the push for the newly revised textbooks by 
the nationalist faction. The organisation behind the textbooks was called the Atarashii Rekishi 
Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai (Society for the Creation of a New History Textbook), Tsukurukai in 
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short. (Nozaki, Selden 2009, 9-22). These textbook controversies served a major role in 
heightening the public profile of nationalist politicians and groups, helping them spread their 
ideas and influence. These books were not used by a large portion of school districts in Japan but 
at the time they sold incredibly well to the general public, reaching bestseller lists and making it 
into newspaper publications (Japan Times 2001). This commercial success and widespread 
diffusion signified that the harsh nationalism which had come from a small vocal minority, was 
now becoming acceptable to a mainstream audience. South Korea was not pleased with this, and 
the „comfort women issue‟ became a recurring problem in international relations from then on 
and the debates surrounding it became increasingly heated. 
An important influence on the nationalism peak of the 1990s was the backlash against Iris 
Chang‟s book The Rape of Nanking. Chang wrote of the atrocities that Japan had committed 
during the Battle of Nanking, mainly sourced from interviews and original research. Japanese 
scholars, especially nationalist and conservative scholars, reacted heavily to this by starting 
research of their own into this event and those surrounding it. One of the most high profile and 
controversial cases is that of Higashinakano Shudo, a researcher from Asia University in Tokyo. 
He authored several publications in which he argues that the atrocities Chang writes about were 
almost entirely fictional, that the death toll was grossly inflated and the testimonies given by 
Japanese interviewees were fabricated (Higashinakano 2005, 152-162). His works are on the 
extreme side of the spectrum, but its tone and stance is typical of the works produced by 
nationalist scholars who are part of the so-called „Illusion School‟: those who believe the 
Nanking Massacre never took place. Publications about the Nanking Massacre had already been 
in the spotlight before in the 1970s due to a book by the Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi, but 
it did not provoke the same amount of controversy. One of the important reasons for this is that 
Chang used images and accounts published by the Chinese government that were proven to be 
fake, which provided the perfect ammunition for conservative and nationalist scholars to be 
outraged about (Askew 2002). None of these events or initiatives served to resolve the issue of 
international friction over historical disagreements, as these are ongoing until this day. Koide 
Reiko believes that it is currently worse than ever before: the progressive thinkers and educators 
have lost, and history classes are now in almost full control of politicians. One of the major 
driving forces of this is the current prime minister, Shinzo Abe (Koide 2014, 9-11). 
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In the late 1990s a different kind of nationalism which involved the public to a great degree 
started appearing. Gavan McCormack describes this new style as more vocal and using 
bombastic rhetoric, moving away from the nationalism based on scholars and politicians and 
instead focusing on nationalist organisations. One of these nationalist organisations that came 
into being in this period is the Nippon Kaigi, or Japan Conference. This group states that Japan 
no longer needs to apologise for its history and past actions and needs to become an independent 
(mainly from the United States) and normal, militarized country once more. Since then, the 
Nippon Kaigi has become one of the most influential pressure groups in Japan, touting many 
conservative politicians among its members such as Shinzo Abe (McCormack 2000, 248-252). 
Possible reasons for the growth of nationalist group at this time are diverse, and the most obvious 
one is the end of the Cold War and the shifts of power than happened at the same time. In the 
early 1990s, China completed its economic reforms and started its own economic miracle while 
Japan‟s economic miracle was ending, signaling the start of long lasting economic stagnation. 
This could have struck fear into Japanese nationalists, instilling a sense of urgency for Japan to 
find a solution to the changing balance. Another likely reason is that internet connections were 
becoming more commonplace. This allows groups like the Nippon Kaigi to spread its message 
and ideals more easily, and establish a loose web of influence within which communication is 
efficient and cheap. Another reason could be the growing influence of globalization, which 
comes with its own fears and worries that might lead people to embrace a more conservative and 
in this case nationalist way of thinking. Lastly, the new style of nationalism could simply be due 
to a new generation of nationalists taking over. The men and women who had seen the war were 
starting to decline in number, and young nationalists and especially politicians were looking for a 
way to prove themselves. Because they did not experience the war firsthand, they would have 
had a more detached view of the war that explains a different perspective, and thus a different 
way of expressing their nationalistic feelings and views. One of the organisations that sprouted 
from this new movement was the Group of Young Diet Members Concerned with Japan‟s Future 
and History Education, notably with Shinzo Abe as its secretary general (Nozaki, Selden 2009, 
12). 
Good examples of the new type of nationalism are the now very high profile public visits 
to the Yasukuni Shrine by government officials. The Yasukuni shrine is internationally 
controversial since it enshrines several war criminals from the Second World War. Previously to 
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the 2000s these visits had also been made but much more low-profile. Despite the international 
controversies that these visits provoke, conservative politicians continue to visit the shrine, albeit 
not at every chance they get. Pollman believes that the reason behind these visits are to drum up 
nationalistic sentiments so that politicians are able to garner more domestic support for their 
goals when their international support is unstable. The most obvious goal that the current prime 
minister is trying for is the revision of the Japanese constitution, specifically the pacifist article 
nine, so that the Japanese state may remilitarize and thus „become a normal country again‟ 
(Pollman 2016, 124-128, 148-150). This goal has antagonized South Korea in recent years. On 
top of South Korea‟s protests against Japanese historical revisionism of its wartime past, mainly 
the Comfort Women issue, the South Korean government has also proclaimed itself wary of 
increased Japanese military activity in East Asia due to Abe‟s plans for constitutional changes to 
the pacifist article 9 and is worried that Abe is putting Japan back on the path to its wartime ways 
(Lee 2014). Aside from being a genuine worry, South Korea could also be seen as balancing 
between Japan and China. South Korea is already an ally of the United States, but if they are too 
approving of Japan they risk losing a friend in China which endangers their position as a „middle 
power‟ between these two countries.  
In this chapter we have seen the reemergence of nationalism after the Second World War 
and the changes it has undergone since then. At first it was mostly a reaction to the defeat and the 
shame that people felt about the events of the war. In the 1980s and 1990s the textbook 
controversies indicated that not only were nationalists willing to reinterpret history on a grander 
scale, but nationalism became politicized more than before and led to the interpretation of history 
as being something political rather than a subject of research. When in the 1990s nationalism 
shifted again, we can see that it changed from something on a smaller, social scale and a political 
tool to nationalist organisations such as the Nippon Kaigi. While this could be interpreted as 
nationalism becoming less political, the reality is that many conservative politicians are members 
of such organisations. The shift we have seen over several decades is that nationalism grew into 
both a social and political force with strong ties to political parties and heads of state through 
personal connections and membership of nationalist organisations. Officially, nationalist 
organisations such as Nippon Kaigi have no governing power but when a large portion of the 
conservative party is a member it cannot be ignored when considering how politicians are 
influenced and by whom. We established that the main worries of South Korea have been Abe‟s 
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plans for constitutional changes and his historical revisionism, most notably in the Comfort 
Women issue. In the next chapter we will look at Abe‟s policy behavior more in-depth to further 
analyze what his goals are and how he has tried to achieve them, and in doing so establishing 
what his win-sets were in trying to balance relations with South Korea and domestic interests. 
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Chapter 2: Abe‟s policy behavior 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the development of post World War II nationalism in Japan, 
and saw how it led to a new style of nationalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Building on 
that knowledge, in this chapter we will go into the „behavior‟ portion of our analysis, looking at 
the effects of nationalism on Abe‟s politics that affect relations with East Asia: the decisions that 
were made and how they were put into practice by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016. In 
between these two prime ministers there was a period of rule by LDP conservatives, but they 
were decidedly less nationalist in nature. We will look at and analyse the major controversies and 
decisions made. 
 To determine what constituted a win-set for Shinzo Abe, we must review his actions on 
an international scale. His behaviour on this level would logically fall within a win-set. We 
already know that Abe is internationally perceived as a nationalist from the conservative party. 
During his first presidential year in 2006, Abe‟s nationalism was not so apparent although he had 
been known as a member of nationalist organisations such as the Tsukurukai and Nippon Kaigi. 
This is probably due to him following party politics which were more moderate at this time. 
During his campaign and subsequent prime-ministership from 2012 until today, he followed a 
new strategy that was decidedly nationalist in nature. While Abe did not visit the Yasukuni 
Shrine at all during his first presidential year, he later expressed remorse for not doing so during 
his campaign for his second term in 2012. He did, however, send financial offerings to the 
shrine. In 2013 Abe made the first official visit to Yasukuni shrine in seven years, stating that it 
was an anti-war gesture and not meant to provoke neighbouring countries. Both China and South 
Korea reacted negatively to this event (Gentry 2014, 33-39). Abe‟s assurance that it was an anti-
war gesture unsurprisingly fell on deaf ears: known as a staunch nationalist in East Asia, Abe 
had supported historical revisionism projects in the late 1990s and had proven himself to be a 
financial supporter of Yasukuni shrine. It is also very unlikely that Abe would be unaware that a 
positive international reaction to his visit could only be a negative one, so it is likely that Abe 
was subordinating international relations to the interests of his nationalist constituents. 
While Abe was fiercely nationalist during his campaign, he has shown to be more pragmatic 
during his tenure. He has been diplomatically careful in negotiating on territorial disputes, only 
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visited Yasukuni shrine once and has not pushed educational revisionism as much as someone 
with his background could be expected to. However, two key nationalist themes have reoccurred 
during Abe‟s prime-ministership that stand out as nationalist: the way that he accomplished the 
enactment of his economic plan colloquially called „Abenomics‟, and his pursuit of 
constitutional revisionism in order to remilitarise Japan. While Abenomics is not essentially 
nationalist in itself, Abe touted it as a way to make Japan great again and as a way to re-entrench 
Japan as one of the most powerful countries in the world. Nagy argues that Abe used nationalism 
and nationalist rhetoric to get people excited about his plan and as a way to strengthen his 
political position so that he could force the necessary laws through government in a top-down 
approach which allowed him to bypass much of the factional politics (Nagy 2014, 8, 9-12). 
Abe‟s goal of constitutional revisionism has not proven to be so easily attained. The reform that 
Abe wants so badly is the revision or removal of Article 9, which is the article that states Japan 
cannot have its own offensively equipped military and will never participate in acts of war. Abe 
stated it is his duty to revise the constitution, and that in doing so he can turn Japan into a 
„normal country‟: a country that can participate in international security operations instead of 
merely supporting its allies financially. He also also stressed that if Japan is equipped with a 
standing military, it will be less vulnerable to international coercion and violence (Yellen 2014). 
 In the previous chapter we mentioned Gavan McCormack, who has a theory that the 
increased nationalism in Japanese politics is a disguise for the further subordination of Japan to 
international goals. One of the visible ways that Abe has tried push an international agenda in 
Japan itself (in this case for its most important ally, the United States) is in Okinawa. 
Approximately twenty percent of Okinawa‟s surface area is occupied by US military bases, 
which were installed after the Battle of Okinawa during which most of Okinawa‟s cities were 
destroyed. One of these bases, the MCAS Futenma, is located inside of a large city named 
Ginowan. A number of high profile controversies and accidents surrounding this military base 
have rallied Okinawans behind the removal of this base. The United States and the Japanese 
government rejected a total removal and instead offered to move the military base to Henoko 
Bay in Nago. The people of Okinawa were strongly opposed to this plan since they feared that 
the construction would cause environmental damage and cause nuisances to the surrounding 
area. To this end they elected Hirokazu Nakaima as governor, who was strongly opposed to its 
construction and promised he would block it. However, Nakaima changed his mind when the 
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Abe administration offered a large amount of financial compensation for the Okinawan 
prefecture in exchange for the green light (McCormack, Norimatsu 2012, 90-92, 158-160). 
Okinawans were outraged, and reacted by electing governor Susume Inamine who vowed to do 
anything in his power to block and hinder construction (Fackler 2014). Abe then opted to not 
react at all and instead force construction to go ahead, ignoring the governor and local 
resistance.The reason that he was able to force this issue is that Okinawa constitutes only a small 
part of Japan, and Okinawans tend to feel quite disconnected from their mainland countrymen. 
Thus, Abe‟s hands were free to push this issue as hard as he wanted. If this took place on the 
mainland, Abe would likely lose a large part of his domestic support. Interestingly, the strategy 
did not work as in 2016 Abe settled in the lawsuits of the Okinawan prefecture and agreed to 
suspend construction for 2 years, although he stated he remains committed to the construction 
plans in Henoko (Fifield 2016). These events suggest that Abe is working hard to accommodate 
the security goals of the United States, among which being the increased activity of the Japanese 
military in the region. In the light of Abe‟s constitutional revisionism, more advanced weaponry 
and bases being in place in Japan could greatly aid remilitarization efforts in the future.  
 A recent example of Abe‟s negotiator role in East Asia has been in the comfort women 
issue described in the previous chapter. While previously there had been no progression in the 
matter, in the end of 2015 Abe and South Korea‟s prime minister Park agreed to a new 
compensation plan for the comfort women. This plan was intended to improve relations and put 
international discussion of the issue to rest, constituting of a Japanese payment of 1 billion yen to 
be put into a foundation to help the aging victims. What is quite interesting is that during the 
negotiation of this settlement, at no point were the victims themselves consulted on what might 
fulfill their needs. This indicates that the deal was directly aimed at silencing international debate 
(Japan Times 2016). The victims reacted by harshly criticizing the deal and demanding personal 
apologies from the Japanese government. Shinzo Abe responded that the Japanese government 
had no intention to implement further measures for the comfort women issue (Japan Times 
2016). This „comfort women deal‟ could also have had more implications for international 
relations than apparent on surface level. A good reason to improve international relations with 
South Korea is to pave the way for changes to the Japanese constitution: if South Korea - Japan 
relations are more amicable South Korea is likely to protest constitutional changes on the 
international stage and it is also less likely to damage existing ties with South Korea. 
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In this chapter we have analyzed Abe‟s behaviour and it strongly suggests that his win-sets are 
predicated on not seeming too submissive to international interests to his domestic nationalist 
base while avoiding serious international conflict. Abe has pursued two main goals: the revision 
of the pacifist constitution article 9 and he has resolved the comfort women issue to the South 
Korean government's satisfaction. The second goal was made possible by Abe realizing that his 
domestic base would not be too upset by a business-like financial solution, thereby satisfying a 
win-set for this issue. Resolving the Comfort Women issue might also be a step in making South 
Korea more accepting of his other goal, changing the constitution to allow for increased regional 
involvement of the Japanese military. Abe‟s nationalist base already approves of this goal, so it 
is likely in this area that Abe has to solve a problem in order to fulfill this objective. We further 
established that the Comfort Women issue and constitutional revisionism are the two issues that 
South Korea has the biggest stake in. Therefore, we will mainly address these two issues in the 
next chapters: What Abe needs to consider domestically in dealing with these issues and how he 
balances to achieve international stability and domestic approval. 
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Chapter 3: Abe’s domestic considerations 
 
In the previous chapters we have looked at what constituted a win-set for Abe in international 
relations with Japan‟s close neighbours by looking at their behaviour on the international stage. 
In this chapter we will examine what priorities on the domestic level seemed to have played a 
part in their role as negotiators. Since we are trying to uncover the nationalist influences on their 
behaviour, we will mainly be looking at nationalist organisations and sentiments. We have 
already mentioned the most important nationalist organisation several times in the previous 
chapter: the Nippon Kaigi. Abe is a member and in fact the vast majority of the LDP is part of 
the Nippon Kaigi. After its founding in 1997 as a merger of several conservative groups, Nippon 
Kaigi rapidly became the most famous and powerful nationalist organisation in Japan. This is a 
nationalist political and religious (Shinto) organisation which is not a political party unto itself. 
Its mission is officially to rebuild a beautiful and independent Japan, which includes restoring the 
position of the Japanese emperor and Japanese traditions; patriotic education; revision of the 
Constitution and to sanction official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine at which war criminals are 
enshrined. At the time of writing, Mark Mullins wrote that two of the Nippon Kaigi‟s principal 
aims were to revise education on the events of the Second World War, and the restoration of the 
military as a normal part of the Japanese state (Mullins 1997, 110-121). These two principal aims 
are both goals that the LDP has worked toward under Abe. 
 An important domestic consideration for Abe that does not concern nationalism is that he 
cannot afford to alienate the majority of domestic voters apart from his nationalist base. The 
immediate obvious problem is that the majority of Japanese people are in favor of a pacifist 
Japan, and Abe is trying to revise the pacifist article 9 of the constitution. More than a few 
people are wary of his chosen course of action, expressing their doubts in ways such as calling 
the planned revision a „war bill‟. According to Van Buren, voters opposed the legislation to 
enable the revision by two to one because they are proud of the pacifist article in the constitution 
as is. If Abe continues to alienate the majority of the population he cannot count on their support 
when he comes up for reelection (Van Buren 2015). 
 Out of all the things Japanese voters care about, they seemingly care most about 
economic plans and prosperity. This is partially why Abe has been able to be so successful while 
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making changes, such as plans for constitutional revision, that a large portion of the electorate is 
opposed to. During the elections for his second term, he mainly focused on what is now called 
Abenomics. The promise for economic rejuvenation is likely the most important factor in his 
success. We have argued earlier that his economic plans were presented and packaged with 
strong nationalist rhetoric to make Japan great and prosperous once more. While Abe‟s 
international policy is controversial, he can remain in power as long as there is no economic 
downturn. A crucial part of his strategy is keeping the domestic front happy by producing 
economic results, so that he can continue his streak of increasingly assertive international policy-
making. Pollman noticed this strategy at work when Abe lost approval ratings after proposing the 
legislation on constitutional revisionism, and surmised he would focus on economic rejuvenation 
based on his first term as prime minister when he lost the elections due to economic malaise 
(Pollman 2015).  In the next chapter we will see that this is exactly what happened. 
 If we assume Abe was mainly drawing on support from nationalist elements to generate 
win-sets, there has to be a sizeable enough base of nationalists and those who don‟t strongly 
disagree to offset those who would oppose a nationalist strategy. This is another domestic 
consideration for Abe. As we have seen in the first chapter, there is a sizeable nationalist faction 
in Japanese politics to draw support from. This is likely how Abe is able to rely on these groups 
to keep supporting him through his international relations strategy: to get support for a decision, 
such as further integrating security strategies with the American military, Abe does so under the 
guise of nationalist goals such as revising the pacifist constitution. That way, he can fulfill both 
an international objective and a domestic (in this case nationalist) objective at the same time, 
thus satisfying a win-set. Despite Abe seemingly relying partially on nationalist backing, the 
majority of Japanese outside of members of organisations such as Nippon Kaigi are not likely to 
be extreme nationalists. Therefore, Abe must be somewhat careful to not seem too overzealous in 
his nationalism. If he does, he risks being seen as a dangerous politician since most Japanese are 
not likely to support ideas such as bringing back the pre-war system of the Emperor and Shinto 
religion as the central pillars of society, or using an aggressive policy to deal with conflicts in 
East Asia. Both the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun newspapers of Japan conducted 
large-scale polls in which a majority of Japanese said they opposed a legally revised article 9 
(Asaoka, Teraoka 2016). Moderate nationalism on the other hand is not seen as dangerous, won‟t 
drive away the general public and assures Abe of the support of nationalists if they see him as 
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being their best representative. It stands to reason that Abe needs to consider his more moderate 
constituency also. 
As for other groups of citizens who aren‟t easily categorized as either nationalists or the 
bulk of moderates, the amount of Japanese citizens that feel disenfranchised by moderate 
nationalism are likely only a small portion of the population. This category would contain 
smaller groups such as the Okinawans, who we discussed briefly in the previous chapter as being 
disenfranchised from Japan for a long time, the native Ainu of Hokkaido and other such groups. 
These groups barely number a few million citizens, and therefore are not likely to be risks to 
Abe‟s or the LDP‟s political positions. These groups are simply not numerous enough for Abe to 
take them into serious account for domestic balancing efforts.  
Taking the factors discussed in this chapter into consideration, we can conclude that Abe 
has to balance sincere nationalism with being seen as a rational, balanced leader to the non-
nationalistic voters. His nationalist base, including organisations such as Nippon Kaigi, and the 
more moderate masses are the most important groups Abe has to balance for in his planning. 
Smaller groups are not very numerous of themselves and Japan is a fairly homogeneous nation, 
making it easy for Abe to ignore this audience to a certain extent. How Abe balances the relevant 
domestic interests with his goals that affect Japan‟s international relations will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Domestic Balancing 
 
In this chapter we will be uncovering and analysing how Abe balances between domestic 
considerations and international concerns when he is playing the role of negotiator. One of the 
ways in which we can see Abe balancing the international with the domestic is his use of public 
speeches. In these speeches he usually outlines his international policies and the intent behind the 
policies. The international policies themselves are often not nationalist in and of themselves, but 
the part where he describes the intent often carries nationalist sentiment. The method we will use 
to analyse how Abe is pandering to nationalist groups is to compare his speeches to a list of goals 
that most Japanese nationalist groups have in common. For this purpose, we will use the official 
objectives list from Nippon Kaigi as they are the largest and most influential nationalist 
organisation. Their objectives are as follows. 
1. A beautiful tradition of the national character for Japan‟s future. 
2. A new constitution suitable for the new era. 
3. Politics that protect the country‟s reputation and the people‟s lives. 
4. Creating education that fosters Japanese sensibility (which in this context has meant 
historical revisionism). 
5. Contributing to world peace by enhancing national security. 
6. Friendship with the world tied up with a spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity 
(Mizohata 2016, 3) 
Objective 6 seems vague and broad, and is a goal that most democratic leaders would say they 
are striving for, so we will disregard this for the purposes of this chapter. The rest however are 
very specific or their intent is discernible from the context of Nippon Kaigi‟s past behaviour, 
such as constitutional revisionism which is visible in objectives 2 and 5 and historical 
revisionism and protection of Japan‟s reputation in objectives 3 and 4. Nippon Kaigi is also keen 
to „restore Japan‟s pride‟ from the prewar era, and to stop being apologetic over the events of 
World War II. Nationalistic historical revisionism is part of this vision. 
In Abe‟s address to the 189th Session of the Diet, he opened with a peculiar statement: “To take 
Japan back - this is the only way forward”. Abe then goes on to say that this means economic 
revitalization, restoration from disaster, social security reforms and other such domestic policies. 
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He also notes the revitalization of security, which is a nod to Abe‟s wish for constitutional and 
military reform. Abe then draws from an entirely different sentiment when discussing the same 
vision: “There is no reason why the Japanese people of today cannot achieve what their 
predecessors achieved in the Meiji era” (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet 2015). This 
type of wistful remembrance of a supposedly superior bygone era is something that Japanese 
nationalists fully embrace according to their ideology. This speech is quite focused on national 
pride and patriotism, but doesn‟t go further into anything specific. There is an interesting 
difference between these kinds of speeches, and those that are geared toward a specific topic. For 
example, on September 25 in 2015 Abe made an opening statement in which he directly 
addressed concerns about his plans for constitutional revisionism, stating that it was not a „war 
bill‟ as domestic concerned parties had called it. Internationally he notes that his proposition had 
gained widespread support, ignoring the sounds of protest from Japan‟s neighbours. What makes 
this speech interesting is that it shows how Abe avoids speaking in nationalist or patriotic 
rhetoric almost entirely when trying to gain support for a Japanese military with offensive 
capabilities. Instead he speaks of peace and international diplomacy (Prime Minister of Japan 
and his Cabinet, September 2015). We can clearly see Abe balancing between nationalism in 
speeches like the first one we discussed which address the Japanese nation. This kind of speech 
is more likely to be paid close attention to internationally because of its more focused topic and 
Abe then chooses something more acceptable to international audiences. This is also visible 
during Abe‟s statement during the 70th anniversary of the Second World War. Abe repeatedly 
expresses deep remorse for the events of World War II while reiterating that Japan felt pressured 
to go to war by international circumstances. Abe then uses this platform to promote his plans for 
constitutional revisionism and military reform by saying that this will contribute to a „proactive 
contribution to peace‟. It is quite clear that Abe is trying to spin a proposition that is seen by 
Japan‟s neighbours as a threat into something that is meant for peace (Prime Minister of Japan 
and his Cabinet, August 2015).  
In a different speech in May 2015 Abe elaborates on his vision of proactive 
peacekeeping, saying that Japan will never want to go to war and simply needs more tools to 
defend itself. He does not mention how this contributes to peace internationally. In this speech he 
appeals to fear: he repeatedly mentions that Japan is in danger from neighbouring countries who 
are sending their military into Japanese territory, but does not specify which countries that would 
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be. Once again, he says that fears of war are unwarranted. He also notes that the current situation 
makes no sense since Japan cannot help its ally, the United States, even if they are protecting 
Japan. Here he is appealing to the sense that Japan lacks international normalcy (Prime Minister 
of Japan and his Cabinet, May 2015). When Abe is talking about hostile navy vessels and aircraft 
entering Japanese territory that sounds scary to Japanese citizens, but in actuality this mainly 
concerns the disputed territories between Japan, China and Russia. 
In the previous chapter we already discussed how Abe is alienating a large portion of the 
Japanese population by pushing through this constitutional revisionism. So how does he plan to 
get reelected when this is such a large part of his international policy? The way that the domestic 
and the international in this case is two-fold. He starts by pushing through legislation that allows 
for revision of the pacifist article 9. This legislation is not voted upon by the population and then 
proceeds to go through the upper house who can vote on the matter. However, it is not likely that 
they will vote on it and the vote will then move back to the lower chamber, where Abe holds a 
majority through his coalition. In short, there is almost nothing that can stop this legislation from 
going through apart from serious internal conflicts in Abe‟s coalition (Van Buren 2015). The 
second part is that once the elections come around, he stops mentioning his plans for 
constitutional revisionism. During the elections of 2016, Abe and his allies ran on the platform of 
Abenomics. Since this is something Japanese have voted for in the past, it is unlikely that 
Abenomics is an offensive platform to a large group of people. If the LDP had focused on 
constitutional revisionism as an election platform, they would likely have failed. When Abe 
himself comes up for reelection, he will likely adopt the same strategy of avoiding risk and 
presenting himself as the safe option. This is an effective tool with which politicians can do 
controversial things in the middle parts of the terms they serve, and then scale back during the 
end when they have to win (re)elections. In these last three paragraphs, we can see Abe‟s actions 
coinciding with Nippon Kaigi‟s second objective of revising the constitution. 
In Abe‟s handling of the Comfort Women issue, we can clearly see the limits of the win-
set Abe had to work with. The win-set allowed for an international monetary settlement but 
clearly excluded personal apologies and affirmations of guilt. These seem like simple 
concessions to make, but are of a decidedly different nature than a financial solution. By 
avoiding an outright apology or a sweeping admission of guilt, Abe manages to avoid 
besmirching Japan‟s name or making admissions that nationalist elements of the Japanese nation 
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would abhor, but he still manages to fix an issue that was becoming an increasingly international 
diplomatic problem and a stain on Japan‟s international relations record. By stretching the 
domestic win-set into yet another, albeit this time larger, monetary compensation than in 
previous attempts, he was able to make a deal with the South Korean government and bypass the 
victims themselves. This way, he was able to fix an international problem and keep Japanese 
nationalists satisfied. Comparing this settlement with the list of Nippon Kaigi‟s objectives, it 
satisfies both objective 3 by safeguarding Japan‟s reputation while also fulfilling objective 6 by 
improving co-prosperity and co-existence in the region. 
One of the tools Abe uses to balance between the domestic and international is to fund 
scholarly research on controversial topics in place of commenting on them himself. For example, 
in his speech on Japan‟s role in the Second World War, Abe states his stance will follow a report 
made by the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan‟s Role and the 
World Order in the 21st Century. That sounds very impartial, but in actuality their report is very 
supportive of an increasingly active role for Japan in international security matters, mentioning 
that it is imperative that Japan „ramp up‟ its efforts for a „pro-active contribution to peace‟. This 
is not an unbiased report or scientific article, it is an advisory piece which largely mimics what 
had already been Abe‟s stance on the issue (Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century 
and on Japan‟s Role and the World Order in the 21st Century 2015, 45). It is worth mentioning at 
this point that Nippon Kaigi is not only deeply connected to government through member 
politicians, but also to the academic world in the same way. Mizohata notes that Nippon Kaigi 
supporters in academic circles are prominently visible in the discussion surrounding the pacifist 
constitution and perhaps form the majority of academics not opposed to the revision of the 
pacifist article. Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide claimed during a Diet discussion that there were 
many constitutional scholars who were in favor of constitutional revisionism. When pressed, he 
could only name academics who were Nippon Kaigi members. These academics were also the 
founders of two lobbying groups supporting constitutional revisionism (Mizohata 2016, 2-3). 
When Abe vows to fund scholarly research or follow independent reports, this does not ensure 
that organisations such as Nippon Kaigi have no influence in the matter. 
In this chapter we analyzed how exactly Abe executes his balancing act between 
international concerns and interests of domestic groups. In the speeches we looked at we could 
see that many of Abe‟s goals and visions are paralleled by mission statements and interests held 
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by Nippon Kaigi, at least when the speeches are meant for a domestic audience. In speeches 
directed outward at the international stage he takes a more moderate stance, and of course he 
can‟t use nationalist rhetoric to influence international audiences. This is how Abe promotes and 
uses nationalism domestically while placating international concerns of a pre-World War II 
Japan reemerging. The Comfort Women issue was handled in a way that was acceptable to his 
nationalist and conservative base since it did not offend their sensibilities overtly, while still 
being acceptable to the South Korean government. As mentioned in chapter 2, this conflict 
resolution with South Korea might also be a way to convince its government to be less resistant 
to the idea of an expanded role for Japan‟s military in the region once Abe achieves his goal of a 
non-pacifist constitution. In his election strategy, Abe tends not to use nationalism or his goal of 
constitutional change as an election platform but instead focuses on economic reform and 
recovery which appeals to a much broader audience. Once he is elected his can shift his own 
focus toward these more controversial policies. He does not need to run on these issues exactly 
because he is so entwined with his nationalist constituency: they already know he will be striving 
for these goals.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have set out to answer how and to what extent nationalism and nationalist 
organisations influence the decision making process on East Asian foreign policy of the Abe 
administration. To gather pertinent information and answer this question I have considered the 
domestic considerations of Abe during his prime ministership that he had to work with in his 
international considerations and negotiations. To do so, I have used the methodological 
framework of the Two-Level Game by Robert Putnam, identifying win-sets which are the terms 
that if accepted lead to an agreement on the international level because it is agreeable to the 
domestic players.  
In the first chapter we explored the historical context of Post-World War II nationalism in 
Japan and how it has changed since then. Here we established that nationalism grew from being 
a largely localised and individual matter into a politicized issue in the 1980s and then took an 
organized form in the 1990s with the establishment of the Nippon Kaigi and historical 
revisionism efforts. Most importantly, we concluded that this organised form of nationalism 
became deeply intertwined with Japanese politics as a whole due to the mass membership of 
politicians. This chapter set up our analysis of what kind of domestic players Abe has to balance 
with to fulfill win-sets.  
In the second chapter, we analysed Abe‟s international policy behaviour to learn what his 
win-sets were. Here it became quite clear that Abe‟s negotiator role in the international sphere is 
to prevent conflicts while preventing damage to Japan‟s integrity which can be understood as a 
minimum amount of groveling and apologies for the events of World War II and backing down 
too much on territorial conflicts. We learned that there are two win-sets that Abe actively 
pursued, one of which has been fulfilled. The Comfort Women issue was becoming too much of 
an international scandal which led Abe to pursue new avenues to resolve it with South-Korea, 
something nationalist politicians had largely been opposed to doing. The domestic balancing he 
had to do to attain a win-set was to make it a financial compensation and not an apology or a 
widespread admission of guilt. This way it was acceptable for his nationalist constituency as it is 
more akin to a business transaction than anything else. The second win-set Abe is still actively 
pursuing is that of constitutional revisionism. Internationally, he wants to appease American 
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pressure to increase Japanese involvement in regional security matters. Domestically, this has 
been a goal of nationalists and conservatives for many years. The balancing he has to do here is 
make the non-nationalist citizens approve of this project or find a way to push his legislation 
through without them.  
This became further elucidated in chapter 3 in which we addressed what domestic 
concerns are most important in negotiating for decisions that change Japan‟s international 
strategy. We established that while the Nippon Kaigi is the largest immediate influence on Abe‟s 
considerations, Abe has to be careful not to alienate the mostly non-nationalistic voters which are 
in the majority and are mostly opposed to constitutional revisionism. We concluded that Abe‟s 
nationalistic base and the more moderately inclined majority are the two groups he needs to 
balance for the most. Smaller groups such as the native people of Hokkaido or Okinawa, or 
communists are small enough to ignore.  
In the fourth and final chapter we analysed how exactly Abe coordinates his domestic 
balancing efforts. To this end we analysed a number of his speeches in which we encountered 
nationalistic rhetoric in speeches aimed toward the domestic audience and switches to more 
moderate statements intended for an international audience. In this way, he can promote 
nationalism inward while dissuading international concerns that his constitutional revisionism 
plans are a threat to Japan‟s neighbours. We also analysed Abe‟s election strategy when it comes 
to his plans for constitutional revisionism. We can clearly see that Abe uses Abenomics as the 
platform for the average Japanese citizen as this is something they can support and isn‟t seen as 
dangerous or risky. When the elections come around, Abe and the LDP go completely silent on 
constitutional matters and keep the nationalistic rhetoric to an absolute minimum. It is not 
necessary for Abe to appeal to nationalists, since he can already count on their vote due to their 
knowledge of his strategies and his continued support of nationalist organisations and goals. As 
long as Abe can promote economic prosperity and focuses on economic issues during elections 
the public will tolerate his more controversial international strategies. Once he is elected and 
safely in office for the next four years, Abe can essentially use all the political tools available to 
him to pursue other strategies such as constitutional reform. We also observed that Due to 
Nippon Kaigi‟s integration with the political and scientific world, it can be difficult for the 
average Japanese citizen to know exactly which information is trustworthy as coming from an 
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unbiased source and that this is a tool that could be used to appease domestic concerns of risky 
decisions that endanger Japan‟s regional relations.  
 Using two-level game theory we can clearly see the role of nationalism in Abe‟s 
international negotiations. In the case of the Comfort Women issue, a win-set that was agreeable 
to both countries already existed if you didn‟t take nationalism into account: a sincere apology 
combined with additional financial compensation is something that the majority of Japanese 
citizens would have had little to no qualms with. However, since Abe counts on support from 
conservatives and nationalists, the win-set from the Japanese side was too narrow to overlap with 
South Korea‟s win-set. When the issue became too much of an international nuisance, Abe 
attempted to find a wider Japanese win-set by a marginal amount to allow for a very formal and 
general apology and additional financial compensation which Japanese conservatives and 
nationalists could agree with. In this way, he found the win-set he needed and we could observe 
that Abe is strongly influenced by nationalist concerns in international negotiations since he 
specifically balanced for them in this instance. 
As for Abe‟s plans for a revised constitution, we ascertained that to change Japan‟s 
security role on the international stage, a goal long held by Japanese nationalists and 
conservatives, Abe has had to balance domestically since this is a change that is not supported by 
a majority of citizens. Internationally, this change can be made rather unilaterally with regards to 
its East Asian neighbours since there are no crucial advantages being lost if Japan reemerges as a 
military power: economic agreements are unlikely to unravel and superficial relations based on 
historical differences are unlikely to be fully resolved in any case. Despite that, it is still likely 
that Abe made the comfort women deal to soften the South Korean backlash to constitutional 
changes. The win-set that Abe had to fulfill on the domestic level involved balancing nationalism 
to appeal to nationalists and conservatives who supported it in the first place and increasing 
economic prosperity for those that are opposed to or don‟t care about the constitutional changes. 
Putnam‟s original version of the Two-Level Game was useful but not completely adequate in this 
research and the scope had to be expanded. Yasuaki and Knopf‟s criticisms of Putnam‟s theory 
have proven correct in our case. Yasuaki said that a leader can use nationalist or otherwise 
situationally appealing rhetoric to influence domestic groups leaving them confused as to what‟s 
being negotiated or what they are voting for. In Abe‟s case this has proven absolutely correct: he 
diverts attention from controversial issues when he and his party are in the middle of elections, 
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and uses different rhetorical styles for different audiences to present his plans in a different light 
each time. Knopf was also correct in his argument that alliances outside of the two countries that 
are negotiating are highly influential: in the case of Japan and South Korea this would be the 
United States of America which is allied to both countries separately. The stabilizing influence 
of the American military presence reassures both countries on security issues, and the knowledge 
that the USA might reduce its presence might convince South Korea of the necessity of an 
increased military presence in the region that is not China, such as Japan. Overall, Two-Level 
Game Theory has provided critical insight into how organised nationalism and its connections to 
politics and Abe himself have influenced his decision making and how he used it and balanced 
for it in his international decision making and negotiation. This has largely been unexplored in 
research on Japan - South Korea relations and it shows further research in this vein is required to 
see how domestic influences affect leaders in their decision making process on an international 
level, and how this type of research can be integrated in International Relations theory.  
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